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Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendmentt
Brett M. Frischmannt
Much of the data that travels on the Internet is speech,
communications among many different people from many differ-
ent cultures for many different purposes. The emergence of the
Internet-with all of its communications-enabling features-has
had significant impacts on many speech-dependent social, cul-
tural, and economic systems as well as the laws that regulate
those systems.1 The impacts are not all "in cyberspace" but ra-
ther are relevant to our lives on and offline, everyday.
Many of the hottest debates in copyright, trademark, tele-
communications, privacy and other areas of informa-
tionlcommunications law are occurring because of technological
and social changes associated with the Internet. These laws are
hotly contested and (rapidly) evolving. At the core of many de-
bates in these fields, there seem to be First Amendment concerns
lurking. Sometimes these lurking concerns involve formal legal
issues, for example, whether a particular government regulation
of some Internet activity (which almost always involves speech)
triggers First Amendment scrutiny, and sometimes the concerns
involve core First Amendment principles or values without trig-
gering the First Amendment tripwire. 2 I don't propose to identify
t Copyright © 2007 Brett Frischmann
t Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law; Visiting Professor,
Cornell Law School. I thank John Bronsteen, Daniel Farber, Ellen Goodman, Abner
Greene, Mark Lemley, Michael Madison, Jonathan Masur, Mark McKenna, Neil Netanel,
Frank Pasquale, Alan Raphael, Gregory Shaffer, Geoffrey Stone, Alexander Tsesis, Re-
becca Tushnet, and Spencer Waller for comments on earlier versions of this paper. I also
thank the participants in the "Law in a Networked World" symposium, hosted by the
University of Chicago Legal Forum, for their thought-provoking discussions. Finally, I
thank Ann Fenton for providing excellent research assistance.
1 See generally Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production
Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale 2006). See also Brett Frischmann, Cultural Envi-
ronmentalism and the Wealth of Networks, 74 U Chi L Rev 1083 (2007) (reviewing Benk-
ler's book).
2 Of course, it may be unclear whether the tripwire is triggered, as in the case of the
debate over network neutrality regulation. At the Legal Forum symposium, Tim Wu
asked me whether network neutrality regulation would be a weak version of the First
Amendment applied to quasi-sovereigns (private networks). My reply was that network
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and evaluate those lurking issues, however. Instead, I will dis-
cuss how the First Amendment functions from a somewhat pecu-
liar economic perspective, a perspective brought into stark relief
by the emergence of the digital networked environment and the
persistent pressures it faces for government regulation. 3
Specifically, I suggest that the First Amendment functions
as a spillover-promoting institution that sustains a spillover-rich
environment. (As "spillover" is a species of "externality," we could
reframe this to say that the First Amendment promotes external-
ities and sustains an externality-rich environment.) As discussed
below, this may seem counterintuitive, at least to one familiar
with economics. We usually assume that the existence of exter-
nalities is a problem in need of a solution and often rely on legal
institutions as internalization mechanisms. We usually assume
that an environment filled with externalities must be unhealthy
and polluted. But, as discussed below, these assumptions may be
flawed when applied to our cultural-intellectual environment.
My objective in this Article is to sketch a positive theory of
speech, spillovers, and the First Amendment. 4 While I believe
neutrality regulation would manifest and implement a strong commitment to a set of core
First Amendment values, but it neither triggers the First Amendment tripwire nor is it
somehow mandated by the First Amendment. Tim and I may explore this further in a
separate paper. Others have begun to examine the relationships between the First
Amendment and network neutrality regulation. See, for example, Bill D. Herman, Open-
ing Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 Fed Comm L J 103, 113-
14 (2006) (arguing that "society should guarantee that every online communicator serves
as his or her own uncensored editor because that best upholds the democratic values of
free speech and freedom of the press."); Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality
to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33 N Ky L
Rev 483, 505-10 (2006) (discussing how "intermodal competition poses new challenges for
maintaining a sustainable balance of common carriage obligations and free speech
rights"); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv J L & Tech 1, 47-48
(2005) (suggesting that because "telecommunications networks now serve as the conduit
for mass communications and not just person-to-person communications," the case for net
neutrality is weakened). Some strongly believe that the First Amendment interests in
networks would trigger the tripwire. See, for example, Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality
Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 3 ISJLP 197 (2007) (opin-
ing that net neutrality legislation's restrictions on the "speech" of internet service provid-
ers would likely constitute a violation of the First Amendment).
3 Consider Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 NYU L Rev 1, 2 (2004) (similarly
arguing that "the Internet and digital technologies help us look at freedom of speech from
a different perspective").
4 Of course, this may be impossible. Perhaps attempting to isolate positive theory
from normative theory is pure folly, especially in this area. See, for example, Henry Hans-
mann, The Current State of Law-and-Economics Scholarship, 33 J Legal Educ 217, 232-
34 (1983) (criticizing claims of strict positivism because "[m]ost of the work so advertised
strikes me as having a distinctly normative edge"). Nonetheless, this seems to be an ap-
propriate place to start this line of inquiry, in part because working through the many
normative theories of the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article and in part
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there are strong normative arguments in favor of a First
Amendment that functions in the fashion I describe-arguments
that relate to the traditional set of First Amendment theories
and values-I do not aim to articulate and defend those argu-
ments in this Article, nor do I claim that the First Amendment,
or particular doctrines, ought to be guided or tailored to meet the
vision I describe. 5 My objective is much more modest. I will ex-
plain how I understand the First Amendment to work from a
particular economic perspective that, in my view, complements
existing understandings of the complex and fundamental role of
the First Amendment in our society. 6
because I am mainly aiming to explain my own perspective, which is derived from experi-
ence in the fields of intellectual property and communications and not First Amendment
law.
5 That may be a project for the future.
6 The functional economic view I describe overlaps in interesting ways with other
First Amendment theories and concerns, but it is sufficiently distinct and important to
explore independently. Accordingly, I do not focus directly on the prevalent economic
metaphor used in First Amendment discourse, the Marketplace of Ideas and the concept
that unregulated competition among ideas will lead us closer to the Truth. Abrams v
United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting) (source of the marketplace of
ideas metaphor). I am not especially interested in the end of discovering Truth for a vari-
ety of reasons. I am not altogether convinced that such an end really is, or should be, a
paramount concern of the First Amendment. Truth varies, in the sense that it is often in
the eye of the beholder, context-dependent, subjective, and so on. Besides, truth does not,
and has not, consistently prevailed over falsity, as history tells us, unless one takes such
a long-run view of the truth-finding process that it is rendered meaningless for most
participants. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 26-27 (Cam-
bridge 1982). Arguably, it is the variance in Truths (or perspectives on truth) that the
metaphorical Marketplace supports. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 45 (Harlan David-
son 1947) (arguing that what is believed to be true may be false; that "conflicting doc-
trines, instead of being one true and the other false, [may] share the truth between them"
and both doctrines may be needed to progress; and knowing both the right and wrong
view may build confidence and a deeper understanding of the truth). The aspect of com-
petitive markets that may be most relevant, then, is the idealized market structure of
"perfect competition"-a wide diversity of competitors (speakers) rather than a concen-
trated market-and the aspect least relevant may be competitive drive to satisfy con-
sumer preferences as reflected in price signals. See, for example, Neil W. Netanel, Copy-
right and 'Market Power' in the Marketplace of Ideas, in Howard Shelanski and Francois
Leveque, eds, Antitrust, Patents and Copyright 149, 158-60 (Edward Elgar 2005). On this
account, the government may even have a role in structuring the market, as it does in
most markets. See Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem ofFree Speech 28-51 (Free
Press 1993) (comparing free speech in America to an unregulated market and suggesting
a "New Deal" type of regulatory framework). Our strong aversion to regulation in the
First Amendment context may best be understood in terms of our particular aversion to
government censorship, patronage, and partisanship. Still, in this Article, I do not focus
directly on these important concerns and the First Amendment function of checking gov-
ernment power. Nor do I focus on whether courts applying the First Amendment should
utilize cost-benefit balancing, Posnerian pragmatism, or other decision-making tools
derived from economics. For an illuminating debate on these issues, see Jed Rubenfeld,
The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 Stan L Rev 767 (2001) (criticizing the cost-benefit
approach to free speech, suggesting instead that "purposivism would yield clear answers
to specific First Amendment questions that today seem extremely difficult and contest-
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The Article proceeds in two Parts. In Part I, I explain the
traditional economic arguments about whether or not producers
of externalities should be made to account for the benefits and
costs of their decisions. Then, I explain how speech can be under-
stood as an activity that regularly generates different types of
externalities--costs or benefits realized by parties other than the
speaker or listener that are not fully accounted for in the deci-
sion to speak or transactions related to the speech. Next, I ex-
plain how the case for internalizing speech-related externalities
might appear quite strong and briefly discuss the available insti-
tutional means for doing so-tax, subsidy, regulation, and prop-
erty rights. The bottom line: a government aiming to maximize
social welfare, guided by neoclassical economics, and with the
capacity to regulate speech probably would and should exercise
that capacity in a substantial set of cases.
In Part II, I explain how the First Amendment constrains
the government's ability to force or enable actors to internalize
externalities associated with their speech and what this might
mean from an economic perspective. Of course, the First
Amendment constraint does not ensure that speech-related ex-
ternalities will not be internalized. First, the First Amendment is
not absolute; the government can and does regulate speech in
some limited cases, 7 often with the aim of internalizing negative
externalities. Second, there are other effective, non-
governmental means, such as social norms, for internalizing
some speech-related externalities. Nonetheless, it appears that
participation in many types of speech activities that regularly
produce externalities remains largely unregulated by govern-
ment, social norms, or other institutions.
I reach a tentative conclusion: We live in a spillover-rich
(cultural) information environment, and one that is sustained, in
part, by the First Amendment.
Before proceeding, let me acknowledge that this Article
builds from the pioneering work of others who have explored the
able"); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis,
54 Stan L Rev 737 (2002) (arguing not that "pragmatism is the theory of the First
Amendment" but rather suggesting that "a pragmatic approach is not foreclosed by the
language or background of the amendment or the case law applying it"); Jed Rubenfeld, A
Reply to Posner, 54 Stan L Rev 753 (2002) (defending his purposivist account of free
speech and attempting to show that previous positions taken by Judge Posner confirm
what is wrong with the cost-benefit approach to free speech).
7 See, for example, Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 Harv J on
Legis 389, 394-95 (2004) (listing exceptions to First Amendment).
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First Amendment from an economic perspective.8 Of particular
interest for this Article is the work of Richard Posner and Daniel
Farber. 9 Aspects of Posner's and Farber's analyses anticipate the
analysis in this Article. For example, throughout his article Free
Speech in an Economic Perspective, Posner examines First
Amendment doctrine and justifies First Amendment protection
on the basis of the external effects of speech. In close parallel
with the arguments explored in this Article, Posner suggests that
the strength of First Amendment protection does and should
vary with, among other things, the degree to which speech gen-
erates spillovers. In Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, Farber emphasizes the "crucial in-
sight of public choice theory . . . that, because information is a
public good, it is likely to be undervalued by both the market and
the political system."'10 He applies this insight skillfully to ex-
plore First Amendment categories and doctrines, as well as to
suggest that the First Amendment is only one among many insti-
tutional responses to the predictable undersupply of socially val-
uable speech. In a sense, my perspective extends directly from
these analyses, exploring the different ways in which speech can
lead to spillovers.
I. SPILLOVERS (FROM SPEECH)
A. Spillovers Generally
"Spillover" is synonymous with "positive externality." Both
terms, which I use interchangeably in this Article, refer to bene-
fits realized by one person as a result of another person's activity
8 See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 Suffolk U L Rev
1 (1986) (developing and applying an economic model for the regulation of the freedom of
speech); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 Harv L Rev 554 (1991) (exploring the idea of speech as a public good).
See also R. H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J Legal Stud 1, 1-5 (1977) (analyz-
ing inconsistent attitudes toward and policies regarding the marketplace for ideas and
the marketplace for goods); R. H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The
Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am Econ Rev 384 (1974) (arguing against
the differentiated regulatory treatment of the market for ideas and the market for goods);
Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J L & Econ 1 (1964) (compar-
ing the absolutist laissez-faire doctrine for the market for ideas with the market for goods
and concluding the dichotomy is mistaken); Peter J. Hammer, Free Speech and the "Acid
Bath' An Evaluation and Critique of Judge Richard Posner's Economic Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 87 Mich L Rev 499 (1988) (criticizing aspects of Posner's apphca-
tion of economic analysis to the constitutional issue of free speech).
9 Posner, 20 Suffolk U L Rev (cited in note 8); Farber, 105 Harv L Rev (cited in note
10 Farber, 105 Harv L Rev at 555 (cited in note 8).
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without payment." Externalities, whether positive or negative,
are understood to be an important type of "market failure"-at
times defined as the absence of a market.12 The perceived prob-
lem is that externalities generally are not fully factored into a
person's decision about whether and how to engage in an activity
and consequently may have a distorting effect on market coordi-
nation and allocation of resources. 13 That is, too few (many) re-
sources may be allocated to activities that generate positive
(negative) externalities because those persons deciding whether
and how to allocate resources fail to account for the full range of
benefits (costs). If those unaccounted-for benefits (costs) were
taken into account-internalized-the actors might behave dif-
ferently, for example, by reallocating their resources in a more
efficient manner. 14
For some time, most economists accepted Pigou's view that
the government ought to "intervene" via the tax or regulatory
system and force externality-producing agents to fully account
for their actions.15 Thus, those who engage in activities that pro-
duce negative (positive) externalities, such as pollution (educa-
tion), should be taxed (subsidized) at a level that takes into ac-
count external effects and thus aligns private and social costs
(benefits).16 In his seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost,17
Coase challenged the "Pigovian tradition" and added well-defined
property rights to the menu of options for dealing with external-
ities. '8 Although often read more broadly, Coase mainly intended
11 For a more complete and critical discussion of the law and economics of spillovers,
see generally Brett M. Frischmann and Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum L Rev 257
(2007); Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 Rev
L & Econ 649 (2007).
12 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to
the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in Robert H. Haveman and Julius
Margolis, eds, Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis 59, 67 (Rand McNally 1970) (defin-
ing externality as the absence of a functioning market), discussed in Richard Cornes and
Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 40-43 (Cam-
bridge 1986).
13 Comes and Sandler, The Theory of Externalities at 39-43 (cited in note 12); James
E. Meade, The Theory of Economic Externalities: The Control of Environmental Pollution
and Similar Social Costs 15 (Sijthoff 1973); Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity
at 72-76 (cited in note 12).
14 On the other hand, actors might not behave differently. See Frischmann, 3 Rev L
& Econ at 665-68 (cited in note 11); James M. Buchanan and William Craig Stubblebine,
Externality, 29 Economica 371, 373-74 (1962).
15 A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (MacMillan 4th ed 1932).
16 See Comes and Sandler, The Theory of Externalities at 72-78 (cited in note 12);
Buchanan and Stubblebine, 29 Economica at 381-82 (cited in note 14).
17 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
18 Coase believed externalities to be reciprocal in nature. He critiqued the notion that
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to emphasize the importance of taking into account transaction
costs when comparatively evaluating institutional solutions to
perceived market failures. 19
Spillovers are ubiquitous in society. Most activities produce
external effects, to varying degrees in terms of the magnitude
and distribution of the effects. Why don't we internalize all ex-
ternalities? The simple answer is that it would be impossible. A
related, perhaps more helpful answer is that it would be much
too costly for society. The relevant social costs include the direct
costs of internalization, in other words, the sum of institutional
and transaction costs, as well as indirect social opportunity costs.
Economists tend to focus on the direct costs of internaliza-
tion. According to Demsetz, "[e]very cost and benefit associated
with social interdependencies is a potential externality," and ac-
tual externalities exist where benefits or costs are not taken into
account by interacting parties because "[t]he cost of a transaction
in the rights between the parties (internalization) must exceed
the gains from internalization."20 Transaction costs may be pro-
hibitively high for a variety of reasons, including the number of
people involved, problems associated with tracing benefits and
costs to responsible actors, strategic behavior, and so on.
Beyond transaction costs, however, loom tremendous institu-
tional costs associated with defining, allocating, and enforcing
rights through private, public, and mixed systems of law. 21 From
polluter A causes homeowner B to suffer a negative pollution externality. He viewed the
harm realized by B as jointly produced by both A and B because they engage in interde-
pendent activities (manufacturing and homeownership). See David De Meza, Coase Theo-
rem, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 270-74 (Palgrave Mac-
millan 1998); Cornes and Sandler, The Theory of Externalities at 79-80, 86 (cited in note
12).
19 See Frischmann, 3 Rev L & Econ at 655-56 (cited in note 11).
20 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 348
(1967). Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity, (cited in note 12), made clear the
importance of understanding that the existence of externalities (or the absence of com-
plete internalization) is a function of the relevant institutional setting, incentive struc-
ture, information, and other constraints on the decision-making and exchange possibili-
ties of relevant actors. Comes and Sandler, The Theory of Externalities at 39-43 (cited in
note 12).
21 "While transaction costs could be defined to encompass any barrier that would
preclude reaching a socially optimal outcome, such a broad vision of transaction costs
conflates much too much. We could say that when a user fails to capture spillovers that
result from his [actions], transaction costs in a secondary 'market' are prohibitive-the
user cannot capture the benefits in a transaction with the people who realize the spillover
benefit. The problem with this view is that in many, if not most, cases no transaction is
even possible [because there is no secondary market in the first place]." Frischmann and
Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev at 288 n 115 (cited in note 11). The costs associated with creat-
ing institutions that structure and enable markets might be considered societal transac-
tion costs, but these should be distinguished from costs borne by participants in exercis-
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an economic perspective, property rights are perfectly defined
only in a world without externalities. 22 Of course, as noted, the
real world is not only afflicted with transactions costs but also is
awash in externalities and imperfectly defined property rights.
Though less often acknowledged, and much less studied, by
economists, the indirect social opportunity costs of internaliza-
tion may counsel against internalization. 23 The social opportu-
nity costs associated with internalizing externalities concern sys-
temic choices about the types of societal systems we build and
the environment in which we live. This is a more complicated
point than is fit for this Article, but the basic idea is that there
are significant qualitative differences between a spillover-rich
and spillover-poor environment. At first cut, we might character-
ize the former in terms of a greater degree of freedom to act be-
cause less of what we do is priced, subject to negotiation and
transaction, and contingent on our knowing what exactly it is
that we want. 24 But the differences are deeper, and more com-
plex. They concern more fundamental choices about the paths we
choose to progress along as a society and about how we interlink
or build interdependencies between different societal systems
(for example, cultural, economic, political, and social).25
ing particular transactions.
22 In such a world, the range of "sanctioned behavioral relations among economic
agents in the use of valuable resources" is completely and unambiguously delineated.
Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in Terry L. Anderson and Fred S. Mc-
Chesney, eds, Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Law 142, 144 (Princeton
2003). As Libecap explains: "In the limit, if property rights are so well defined that pri-
vate and social net benefits are equalized in economic decisions, benefits and costs will be
entirely borne by the owner," and thus there will be no externalities. Id at 145. See also
Harold A. Demsetz, Property Rights, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and
the Law 144 (Palgrave Macmillan 1998).
23 As Mark Lemley and I explain, internalization may be undesirable even if feasible;
society may prefer spillovers. See Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev (cited in
note 11) (explaining that such internalization involves social opportunity costs and that
spillovers are often socially desirable).
24 See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 UC Davis L
Rev 1151 (2007) (making this point in the context of copyright policy and cultural pro-
gress); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination
and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 Vand L Rev 2007, 2033 (2000) (same); Molly S. Van
Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright Law, 83 Tex L Rev 1535, 1548-49 (2005)
(same). For many people, the freedom to act would be significantly constrained by their
ability to pay. See generally id (discussing distribution of expressive opportunities, prob-
lems with allocating such opportunities on the basis of willingness and ability to pay, and
some ways in which the First Amendment deals with these issues).
25 I touch on these issues in my review of Yochai Benkler's book, and he develops
them in the book and many of his articles. See generally Benkler, The Wealth of Networks
(cited in note 1); Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism, 74 U Chi L Rev (cited in note
1).
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So what do we do? Often we look for feasible opportunities to
internalize, on a categorical basis, through a variety of different
institutions. That is, we look for activities that persistently gen-
erate externalities, evaluate the magnitude of perceived market
failures, and consider potential institutional solutions. In his se-
minal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Demsetz ad-
vanced a theory of property rights evolution where imperfectly
defined property rights improve and evolve to meet societal de-
mand for the internalization of externalities. 26 While he was fo-
cused on the evolution of private property rights systems, his
theory is compatible with the basic idea of many different types
of institutions evolving to internalize externalities where feasible
(in other words, so long as the benefits of doing so exceed the
costs).
Complex legal regimes have arisen and evolved in large part
to internalize negative (positive) externalities. 27 Take environ-
mental (patent) law, for example. Industrial activities that regu-
larly generate externalities due to complex social and environ-
mental interdependencies give rise to serious market failures for
which government intervention is welcome. Many debate the
form of intervention and argue for different institutional solu-
tions, but it is well understood that the externalities involved
often warrant government action. I should note that such inter-
vention is justified without completely quantifying the magni-
tude of external effects. While we pay attention to benefits and
costs and sometimes attempt complex cost-benefit analyses to get
a sense of tradeoffs involved, it is plain hubris to pretend that we
actually quantify the full range of direct and indirect benefits
and costs. In a sense, we work at a somewhat higher level of ab-
straction or generalization by focusing on categories of conduct or
activities, types of markets and market failures, and so on.
The government plays a critical role in this evolutionary
process by shaping institutions that define, allocate, and enforce
rights. Yet, as discussed below, the First Amendment plays an
important role in constraining the government's role in this proc-
ess where internalizing speech externalities is involved.
26 As Demsetz later explained, "[w]hereas Coase's work examined the consequences
that followed from an existing private-ownership system, I sought to explain why such a
system would come into existence." Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights
II: The Competition between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J Legal Stud 653, 655
(2002). See also Harold Demsetz, Frischmann's View of 'Toward a Theory of Property
Rights,"4 Rev L & Econ 127, 127, 130 (2008).
27 See generally Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev (cited in note 11).
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B. Spillovers from Speech
Speech-a term that includes various forms of communica-
tion-is an activity that regularly generates externalities---costs
or benefits realized by parties other than the speaker or listener
that are not fully accounted for in the decision to speak or trans-
actions related to the speech. Quite frequently, people do not ac-
count for the costs or benefits to third parties when deciding
whether to speak, what to say, where to speak, and so on. Some
external effects are positive; some are negative. The nature of the
effects depends on many factors including, but not limited to, the
content of the speech, the parties, and the context.
As discussed below, speech often impacts the very systems
that give rise to and shape social interdependence. Recall Dem-
setz's observation that "[e]very cost and benefit associated with
social interdependencies is a potential externality." 28 Speech af-
fects social interdependence-our relationships with each oth-
er-in many different ways.
We can start, but must not end, with the notion that speech
involves the communication of ideas, 29 and that it thus involves
the sharing of a public good (for example, ideas, information). 30 If
I communicate an idea to you, we both "possess" the idea, and
you may in turn share it with others. I may not fully account for
such sharing and the benefits and costs that third parties may
obtain from consuming or possessing the idea.31 The point here is
simply that one important category of externalities regularly
generated by speech involves the sharing of public goods (that
can be shared, and shared, and shared again).32
28 Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 348 (cited in note 20).
29 For convenience, I use "idea" both broadly and somewhat loosely to refer to intel-
lectual or mental goods. A tricky issue that I would like to avoid is the distinction be-
tween speech as an activity (communicating an idea), and speech as a thing (the set of
expressed ideas). See Mike J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital
Things, 56 Case W Res L Rev 381 (2005) (investigating the blending of and differences
between 'legal things" and "real things," for example, patent as something concrete that
may be "stolen').
30 On the public good nature of ideas, see Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev
at 272-73 (cited in note 11) and the many sources cited therein. Keep in mind that we are
using the technical economic classification of a public good. This does not mean that the
idea is publicly beneficial. Of course, in some cases, speech conveys harmful ideas that
yield negative externalities. On such ideas, see notes 53-54, 96, and sources cited therein.
31 Intellectual property laws are designed, in part, to enable producers of certain
intellectual works to control some sharing and capture some of the external benefits that
would otherwise flow to third parties. See Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev at
282-83 (cited in note 11).
32 Speech produces public goods as well. Many communications involve the sharing of
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For example, consider a joke.3 3 Suppose I tell my original
joke to John and Jenn at the watercooler. They both laugh upon
hearing the punch line. The next day, John and Jenn each tell
the joke to their spouses, who laugh and the following day tell
the joke to their colleagues at work, who laugh and retell it
again. Assume, for simplicity, that everyone in the distribution
chain forgets the joke after retelling it (it was funny but easily
forgettable), and assume that no one 'learns" anything from the
joke or uses the joke in any other way than retelling it. In other
words, assume the joke has an immediate consumptive value
(laughing at the punch line) and is sharable (can be possessed
and retold by many). The external effects from my speech (joke
telling) might include the third party benefits realized with each
retelling.
Note that the public good (the joke) need not change or be
used in any particular manner; it is the value or harm to third
party recipients of the "message" associated simply with receiv-
ing the "message." Of course, those other persons retelling the
joke also may derive value from being able to communicate the
speech, and this also may give rise to external effects. The set of
external effects derived from sharing public goods is quite impor-
tant and pervasive. While the magnitude of the effects may be
quite small in many cases, the communicative practice of retell-
ing is so widespread and (perhaps) fundamental to our social
lives that, I suspect, the aggregate welfare effects are incalcula-
bly high. 34
But the set of speech externalities discussed so far may be
the least interesting, at least from a First Amendment perspec-
tive. The speech externalities that appear to matter most are
those associated with productive uses of speech. In addition to
being a public good that can be shared, speech is often an inter-
mediate good, an essential input into other activities-the range
already produced public goods, but many communications involve the spontaneous crea-
tion and sharing of public goods. For ease of discussion, I leave this complication aside for
now.
33 If my use of "joke" throws you off, please substitute anecdote, story, or another
form of expression. The point made in the text is not limited to jokes, and I am making no
claims about the benefits and costs from joke telling.
34 As I have noted in various articles, social welfare can be ratcheted up in incredibly
small increments and still lead to significant social surplus. For example, diffusion of
small-scale positive externalities can lead to a significant social surplus when the exter-
nality-producing activity is widespread. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of
Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 Minn L Rev 917, 976, 1019-20 (2005). See
also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L J 535 (2004) (exploring the social value of copying).
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of activities is as wide as the range of ideas. The sharable nature
of speech allows it to be consumed and retold over and over
again, and often, it also allows it to be used productively over and
over again.
The line between idea consumption and idea use is difficult
to draw, because it is not a bright or fixed line.3 5 We might say
idea consumption is an end while idea use is instrumental, a
means to another end. While this division doesn't always work
well, it does capture the basic distinction (and like many such
distinctions, a binary dichotomy grossly oversimplifies).3 6 For
purposes of this Article, consider idea consumption to be associ-
ated with value derived from mere appreciation or possession of
an idea, as illustrated in the joke example above by the joy ex-
pressed in the listener's laughter (not that an external manifes-
tation of one's appreciation is at all necessary to the point). We
might also define consumptive ideas as those ideas that generate
value primarily when consumed-where possession directly
yields value (that is, by appreciation).
Idea use, then, may be associated with value derived from
something other than mere appreciation or possession of an idea,
something that involves other activities and/or other people. On
one hand, some ideas may be deliberately "put to use" in the
sense that the possessor sets out to derive value through some
external actions-for example, opening a business, developing a
product, building a reputation, or developing a new idea.
On the other hand, idea use may be less deliberate and less
well-planned, for example, when one's ideas affect another's (i)
beliefs, knowledge and understanding (hereinafter, "beliefs")37
35 The difficulty is manifest, for example, in the evolving notions of what constitutes
fair use within copyright law. Compare Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Sony
Corp ofAmerica v Universal City Studios, 464 US 417, 457 (1984) (discussing "productive
use"), with Judge Pierre Leval's influential article, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
Harv L Rev 1105 (1990) (emphasizing transformative use), with the Supreme Court's
decision in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 510 US 569 (1994) (examining parody as trans-
formative fair use), with recent approaches taken by circuit courts, such as Blanch v
Koons, 467 F3d 244 (2d Cir 2006); Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F3d 811 (9th Cir 2003);
and SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin, 268 F3d 1257 (11th Cir 2001). See also Tushnet,
114 Yale L J (cited in note 34) (exploring this line drawing problem in the fair use con-
text).
36 See, for example, Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy and
Other Essays (Harvard 2002).
37 Despite numerous complications, for purposes of this Article, I will conflate beliefs
with knowledge and understanding. Ideas and information are distinguishable from be-
liefs, knowledge and understanding because beliefs, knowledge and understanding all
depend upon the human capacity to comprehend ideas and information. So, for example,
sufficient language and education may be necessary complements for information and
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and (ii) preferences. Shaping the beliefs or preferences of others
through one's speech is at the heart of what it means to commu-
nicate; we engage in such communications throughout our lives
and play both roles-speaker and listener-in a reciprocating,
discursive process. 38 Of course, we generally do so deliberately.
Still, it seems plausible to argue that the most subtle and power-
ful way in which speech generates externalities is through the
accidental, playful, or ad hoc sharing and use (and resharing and
reuse) of productive ideas that shape beliefs and preferences. 39 I
recognize that speakers do account for some of the effects their
speech will have on others; such effects are often intended. But
not always, and often, not fully. For example, when speech re-
cipients do not simply consume, as in our joke example, but
rather learn something, it can be incredibly difficult to predict,
observe, or map out potential effects, particularly where speech-
enabled learning impacts behavior in other social systems. 40 Of
course, this depends upon the speech and context.
Speech often has dynamic and systemic implications that are
unanticipated and underappreciated by speakers and their audi-
ence. 41 The effects may be small in magnitude and may not be
immediately salient to the speaker or audience. This is probably
the case for the vast majority of speech. Nonetheless, we should
ideas to produce beliefs, knowledge and understanding. As I have discussed to a limited
extent in this Article (and briefly elsewhere), speech is an activity that communicates
ideas/information and builds human capacity to comprehend through the develop-
ment/practice of language and educational skills. Mill seemed to recognize this when he
suggested that engaging ideas, even those that were false, improved one's understanding
and confidence in the truth. Mill, On Liberty 45 (cited in note 6). See also Balkin, 79 NYU
L Rev at 35-36 (cited in note 3) (discussing "constitutive or performative value" from
participating in culture).
38 I do not believe there is anything novel or controversial here; there are rich litera-
tures on the topic. So I'll avoid the tempting digression into various theories of communi-
cation and culture. Still, it is this latter sense of less deliberate idea use that presents
some conceptual difficulties and measurement problems.
39 Julie Cohen explores a related concept in the context of creativity and cultural
progress. See Cohen, 40 UC Davis L Rev at 1154-77 (cited in note 24) (identifying the
analysis of creativity as particularly problematic for copyright scholars due to the meth-
odological difficulties presented by the complex interactions between individuals, groups,
and broader society in generating creativity).
40 As discussed below, sharing productive ideas that shape beliefs and preferences
may, as a result of such shaping, affect behavior in speech-dependent social systems, such
as cultural, economic and political systems.
41 Compare Balkin, 9 NYU L Rev at 5 (cited in note 3) (describing speech as a fluid
process of meaning-making within a cultural environment). Balkin expresses the idea
that, through speech, individuals are "the architects of their culture, building on what
others did before them and shaping the world that will shape them and those who follow
them." Id.
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expect the aggregate impact across many participants in many
conversations to be substantial, for two reasons. 42
First, and perhaps most obvious, small external effects add
up. Just as the small external benefits from a joke told and retold
and retold and so on can become substantial if the joke spreads
widely across a community, the small external effects from the
shaping of beliefs or preferences can become substantial. Note
that I am not claiming that the external effects are necessarily
positive or that the shaping leads to Truth.43 My claim is simply
that small external effects add up as speech, information, and
ideas propagate.
Second, sometimes the effects are not so small in magnitude;
sometimes the unanticipated and underappreciated effects of
ideas communicated turn out to be quite large in magnitude. Yet,
for a variety of well-understood reasons, it is not easy to "pick
winners," to foresee or even recognize early on those "killer
ideas" that yield substantial social value, 44 occasionally through
systemic change. 45
42 In prior work on infrastructure, I developed a similar argument:
Social surplus (in other words, the amount by which the social value exceeds
the private value) may result from a "killer app," such as e-mail or the World
Wide Web, that generates significant positive externalities, or from a large
number of outputs who generate positive externalities on a smaller scale. That
is, in some situations, there may be a particularly valuable public (or nonmar-
ket) good output that generates a large social surplus, and in others, there may
be a large number of such outputs that generate small social surpluses. Both
types of situations are present in the Internet context. While the "killer app"
phenomenon appears to be well understood, the small-scale but widespread
production of public and nonmarket goods by end-users that obtain access to the
infrastructure appears to be underappreciated (and undervalued) by most ana-
lysts. Yet in both cases, there may be a strong argument for managing the in-
frastructure resource in an openly accessible manner to facilitate these produc-
tive activities.
Frischmann, 89 Minn L Rev at 976 (cited in note 34).
43 See Cass Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (Oxford 2006)
(discussing several methods for obtaining access to many minds and the viability of these
methods in reaching a correct outcome). Of course, the nature and quality of speech mat-
ters considerably. As Julie Cohen explained in a slightly different context, "the nature
and quality of the information available within a community will affect the nature and
quality of human choices and interactions, individual and collective, in both the market
and the public sphere." Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, 97 Mich L Rev 462, 546
(1998).
44 Our embrace of neutrality as a governing First Amendment principle reflects doubt
about government capacity to "pick winners," but our embrace of the "marketplace of
ideas" metaphor arguably reflects a willingness to delegate the responsibility to the mar-
ket. I have serious concerns about such a delegation but leave it aside for now. For con-
sideration of the issue in a slightly different context, see Frischmann, 89 Minn L Rev at
978 (cited in note 34) (arguing that an openly accessible, nondiscriminatory system-a
neutral system-may be an effective but blunt means for eliminating reliance on either
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Let me use a simple example. Consider the speech of a non-
professional blogger pertaining to some political issue (for exam-
ple, the Iraq war, civil rights, property tax reform). The speech
may have external effects beyond those who write, read, or com-
ment on the blog itself because the speech-the ideas and infor-
mation communicated-may impact awareness and opinion with-
in the community affected by the political issue being discussed,
and perhaps ultimately the speech may affect political processes.
The likelihood that any particular speaker will have a noticeable
impact may be small, but that is beside the point. Society bene-
fits when its members participate because of the aggregate ef-
fects, and there is a persistent risk of underparticipation in the
process and of underproduction of the speech. Speech affects
community systems and community members, even community
members who do not participate in the conversation.
The external effects from speech are not limited to political
systems. 46 Speech externalities are often due to complex interde-
pendencies between communication-information systems and
other complementary human systems that depend upon speech
inputs-we can attach many different overlapping labels to de-
scribe these systems including cultural, economic, educational,
political, social, and so on. 47 Speech could be classified in First
Amendment discourse according to the system in which it gener-
ates value. For example, political speech can be thought of as
speech that generates value when used in political systems. But
the market or the government to "pick winners").
45 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962).
46 In developing his theory of a democratic culture, Jack Balkin makes a similar
observation:
Speech ranges over a wide variety of subjects, including not only politics but
also popular culture. The speech of ordinary people is full of innovation and
creativity. That creativity comes from building on what has come before. Speech
is participatory and interactive as opposed to mere receipt of information. It
merges the activities of reading and writing, of production and consumption.
Finally, speech involves cultural participation and self-formation.
And this brings me to a central point: The populist nature of freedom of speech,
its creativity, its interactivity, its importance for community and self-formation,
all suggest that a theory of freedom of speech centered around government and
democratic deliberation about public issues is far too limited.
Balkin, 79 NYU L Rev at 34 (cited in note 3).
47 Ed Baker has explored various types of externalities associated with media con-
tent. See Edwin C. Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 Ohio St L J 311, 350-51
(1997).
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this is not a particularly useful approach for many categories of
speech because the speech-dependent systems overlap with one
another and do not have clear boundaries. The other categories
of speech (besides political speech) recognized in First Amend-
ment discourse are not really tied to complementary systems
where speech-derived value is created. It is beyond the scope of
this Article to explore these ideas concerning interdependent sys-
tems more fully, however.
To this point, I have aimed mainly to suggest that speech
regularly generates externalities and to begin exploring different
ways in which this happens. But I have not yet distinguished
between positive and negative externalities.
In a liberal democratic society, and especially the United
States, much of our society, institutions, and values depend on a
strong commitment to "free speech" and an underlying assump-
tion (or belief) that, on the whole, the social benefits from speech
exceed the social harms. 48 It is understood that, with some ex-
ceptions, which themselves vary across liberal democracies, ro-
bust public discourse and public participation in political, cul-
tural, and other speech-dependent systems benefits society on the
whole. 49 The systems themselves may perform better and become
more valuable to constituents with increased public participa-
tion-there may be network effects involved. Moreover, partici-
pating in public discourse and the various speech-dependent sys-
tems may be socially valuable in itself because it educates and
builds human capacity to participate productively in the future. 50
This seems to be a reasonable assumption, though not uncontro-
versial. Some would surely argue that the assumption makes no
sense because it depends entirely on the types of speech in which
a society engages. We probably get too much speech that gener-
ates negative externalities (because the speaker and audience do
not account fully for the external costs) and too little speech that
generates positive externalities (because the speaker and audi-
ence do not account fully for the external benefits). But keep in
48 See, for example, American Booksellers Association v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 332
(7th Cir 1985) (Easterbrook) (arguing that free speech is necessary for the social good);
Guy E. Carmi, Dignity-The Enemy from Within: A Theoretic and Comparative Analysis
of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U Pa J Const L 957, 960 (2007)
("Freedom of expression is one of the most universally prominent rights in all democratic
legal systems.").
49 See Balkin, 79 NYU L Rev at 34 (cited in note 3) (making a similar point with
respect to political and cultural systems).
50 See discussion in note 37. These tangents are beyond the scope of this Article but
suggest links with other First Amendment theories.
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mind that "too much" negative and "too little" positive do not tell
us that the net external value is negative. It only suggests that
we could be marginally better off with less negative and more
positive and reminds us that the world is imperfect, that such
marginal improvements are not without cost, and so on. Still, my
point is general but not meant to be universally true across all
types of speech; I recognize that there is plenty of trivial, worth-
less, and even harmful speech, and the assumption noted above
very well might flip for certain categories of speech, as I discuss
below. It may be useful, however, to briefly discuss one reason
why we might believe speech will tend toward positive rather
than negative externalities.
People generally choose to participate in conversations, they
choose to retell/share or rework and then retell/share ideas, and
they often deliberately choose to use and reuse ideas-though
not always, as noted above. 51 These choices entail subjective val-
uations and reflect private investments of time, money, effort,
emotion, reputation, and so on. In a decentralized manner that is
different from but perhaps analogous to the market, these choic-
es "filter" beneficial from harmful ideas. 52 I do not mean to sug-
gest that Truth is the eventual end-product, and I do not mean to
suggest that this dynamic process is perfect. It is far from per-
fect. Of course, many harmful ideas are told, shared, used, and
reused while many beneficial ideas are not.
Moreover, for certain types of speech, the costs and benefits
of speech are distributed unevenly across groups so that speech
that is beneficial to some is harmful to others.53 This may occur
because the speech is about another group or social relationships
51 We properly tend to scrutinize more carefully situations where exposure to speech
or participation in a conversation is involuntary. See Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514
(2001) (privacy concerns); FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978) (risk of involun-
tary exposure to radio broadcast).
52 In addition, "as listeners/consumers of communication, we learn to avoid situations
that will be painful and gravitate toward those that will be pleasurable." Email from
Professor Abner Greene, Fordham Law School (Jan 07, 2008) (on file with author).
53 The uneven distribution of benefits and costs from speech is both one of the strong-
est justifications for government regulation to force actors to internalize externalities and
one of the most significant obstacles to speech regulation. While the example in the text
concerns hate speech, many other types of speech fit this description. See, for example,
Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet
(Yale 2007) (noting that gossip or shared social norms may be beneficial to some people
while harmful to others, who are the targets of the gossip or norm enforcement); Frank J.
Sorauf, Politics, Experience and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign
Finance, 94 Colum L Rev 1348 (1994) (bribery); Anne Salzman Kurzweg, Live Art and the
Audience: Toward a Speaker-Focused Freedom of Expression, 34 Harv CR-CL L Rev 437
(1999) (performance art).
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between groups. For example, speech based on discriminatory
beliefs about gender, race, or some other trait perpetuates those
beliefs, benefiting some but harming others. Hate speech is a
category of speech for which the assumption noted above may
flip: the negative external effects may significantly outweigh any
positive external effects, and we might not expect the filtering
mechanism described above to operate. 54
Since my point is general but not meant to be universally
true across all types of speech, we should expect some variation
and look for persistent, identifiable categories where the general
tendency falters. In some cases, we might expect a tendency to-
ward positive rather than negative externalities only in the long
run or under certain conditions of robust participation in public
debate, and in other cases we might expect a tendency toward
negative rather than positive externalities. I hesitate to make
any generalizations about speech given the existence of various
categories of speech that serve as counterexamples, and I con-
cede that the generalization I've tentatively made is a difficult, if
not impossible, proposition to prove empirically. Nonetheless, I
suggest it here because, as important as the counterexamples
are, they seem to be categorical exceptions and the generaliza-
tion seems reasonable for the vast majority of speech that occurs
throughout our daily lives.
Consider storytelling and the manner in which externalities
occur, and let's focus just on the consumptive value derived from
the story. (We could substitute many types of speech for storytel-
ling or talk more generally in terms of sharing ideas.) I tell a sto-
ry, and it is retold by my friends, and then their colleagues, and
so on. The claims about external effects are simply that I do not
take into account fully the benefits or costs down the line, and
the effects are more likely to be benefits than costs because of
successive choices made by re-tellers. If the story were not pri-
vately beneficial (or worse, harmful) to the listener-a potential
reteller-it would be more likely to cease propagating. Keep in
mind that the hypothetical focuses only on the consumptive val-
ue to the listener who might take advantage of the nonrivalrous
nature of ideas and retell the story. In deciding whether to do so,
the listener presumably takes into account whether he or she
54 See Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Must We Defend Nazis?: Hate Speech,
Pornography, and the First Amendment 4-10 (NYU 1997) (discussing the psychological,
sociological, and political effects of hate speech); Mari J. Matsuda, et al, Words That
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Westview
1993).
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found the story beneficial or harmful. 55 This simple example il-
lustrates a speech dynamic that occurs regularly for both con-
sumptive and productive speech.
There is much more to this dynamic than can be explored in
this Article. I mean only to make the point that sharing speech
generally will tend toward positive rather than negative exter-
nalities because participants must choose what is worth sharing
and invest their own resources in retelling, reworking, or using
the ideas. Of course, there are many imperfections and biases.
For example, strategic behavior may lead people to mislead, ig-
norance may lead people to choose poorly, and so on. But, on the
whole, we should end up with more positive than negative exter-
nalities over the long run. Again, let me note that the claim is
not that we will end up with the "best" ideas or the Truth, just
ideas that are more beneficial than harmful.
I will return to the distinction between positive and negative
externalities below, but first it is worth driving home the point
that to the extent speech is an activity that regularly generates
externalities (whether positive or negative), there is reason to
believe that the economic case for government intervention (for
the purpose of internalizing externalities) should be considered
carefully and revisited over time as the costs of internalization
decrease or the benefits of internalization increase. 56
In the realm of speech, the case for internalizing external-
ities may seem quite strong. As noted earlier, people often do not
account for the costs or benefits to third parties when deciding
whether to speak, what to say, where to speak, and so on. Speech
externalities are predictably persistent in our society. As Coase
remarked, "if we ... use for the market of ideas the same ap-
proach ... [as] for the market for goods, it is apparent that the
55 Of course, there may be external effects not accounted for in the example, as when
a racial joke has negative external effects on a racial group. The external effects may be
associated with the shaping of the listener's beliefs or preference regarding the racial
group that is the subject of the joke and such effects may impact the listener-group rela-
tionships (social interdependence). See Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate
Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements (NYU 2002) (examining how hate
speech shapes social relationships). Even if the magnitude of such external effects is
individually small, the small effects add up and may be substantial for the victimized
group. See id. In this situation, the private consumptive value may be positive and the
joke may propagate within the community that is not harmed by such speech. This im-
portant point is relegated to a footnote only because this paper is focused on speech gen-
erally and not on hate speech in particular.
56 See Demsetz, 31 J Legal Stud at 656 (cited in note 26) (noting that "as circum-
stances make the externality more costly to bear, private rights adjust to reduce the seri-
ousness of the externality").
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case for government intervention in the market for ideas is much
stronger than it is, in general, in the market for goods." 57
Internalization would appear to generate the same social
benefits that economists generally applaud-better incentives to
invest in ideas and speech, better transactions, and better de-
mand signals (essentially, better functioning markets). It is well-
recognized, for example, that the public goods nature of ideas
may lead to underproduction because of uncaptured spillovers,
often discussed in terms of "free riding."58 As noted earlier, intel-
lectual property laws are one institutional response to this mar-
ket failure, though intellectual property laws are designed as
incomplete internalization mechanisms. 59 The point works sym-
metrically for the internalization of positive and negative exter-
nalities-"better" means more of the "good speech" and less of
the "bad speech." So, for example, libel law leads to better func-
tioning markets by forcing speakers to internalize the external
harms from their speech. 60 As noted above, however, speech that
generates an uneven distribution of benefits and costs is hard to
classify as "good speech" or "bad speech." Beyond being uneven,
the distribution of benefits and costs may be difficult to observe
or predict. These complications risk high error costs from regula-
tion.
Internalization may seem feasible in some contexts or for
some categories of speech. The administrative and institutional
costs of internalizing speech-related externalities are difficult to
gauge in general, though in some contexts these costs may be
reasonably low. Intellectual property laws could be adapted to
more completely internalize externalities, for example, by elimi-
nating spillover-promoting doctrines like fair use. 61 Hate speech
57 Coase, 64 Am Econ Rev at 389 (cited in note 8).
58 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex L
Rev 1031 (2005) (criticizing free riding rhetoric); Brett M. Frischmann, 89 Minn L Rev at
966 (2005) (cited in note 34) (suggesting that free riders often are simply "incidental bene-
ficiaries').
59 See Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev at 282 (cited in note 11) (explaining
how intellectual property systems are semicommons arrangements that aim to internal-
ize some externalities through private rights but sustain the flow of spillovers through
commons).
60 See, for example, Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law 320 (Stanford
2004).
61 A less dramatic measure than eliminating fair use would be to narrow the doctrine
such that it would only reach situations where high transaction costs preclude a licensing
arrangement between a copyright owner and user. See id at 202-03 (explaining that fair
use sustains (and should sustain) spillover-producing uses even where licensing is feasi-
ble).
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and privacy are hotly contested areas where some argue that
these costs are manageable and that regulation is warranted. 62
Of course, for each context or category, we would need to com-
pare the effectiveness of various institutions including taxation,
subsidization, regulation, and property rights. 63
The bottom line is really a simple, perhaps obvious, point: a
government aiming to maximize social welfare, guided by neo-
classical economics, and with the capacity to regulate speech
probably would and should exercise that capacity in a substan-
tial set of cases. 64
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT
AND SPILLOVERS
The First Amendment constrains the government's ability to
force or enable 65 actors to internalize externalities associated
with their speech. 66 In other words, when viewed from an eco-
nomic perspective, the First Amendment functions as a broad
restriction on the government's choice of actions or interventions
62 See Delgado and Stefancic, Must We Defend Nazis? (cited in note 54); Matsuda et
al, Words that Wound (cited in note 53); Dhammika Dharmapala and Richard H. McA-
dams, Words That Kill? An Economic Model of the Influence of Speech on Behavior (with
Particular Reference to Hate Speech), 34 J Legal Stud 93 (2005) (discussing empirical
support for the proposition that "raising the costs of engaging in hate speech will tend to
deter hate crime"). But see Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and
Stones Defense, 13 Const Commen 71, 98 (1996) (arguing, among other things, that it is
likely that the desire to regulate hate speech is "motivated primarily by hatred of those
with bigoted attitudes and a desire to exercise power over them"). To be clear, I am not
taking a position on regulation of these areas. My only point is that the administrative
and institutional costs of internalizing speech-related externalities in these areas might
be reasonably low. The experience of other liberal democracies in these areas suggests
that regulation may be manageable from an institutional and transaction cost perspec-
tive. See, for example, John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 Pa St L Rev
539 (2006) (comparing the less-restrictive U.S. hate speech regulation with that of other
liberal democracies).
63 The traditional Pigouvian approach would focus on taxes, subsidies, and regulation
aimed at getting actors to internalize externalities; the modern approach inspired by
Coase adds in other institutional means for accomplishing the same objective-primarily
property rights but also other private mechanisms that rely less on government interven-
tion.
64 I should note that, in other work, I have challenged the neoclassical view concern-
ing the internalization of externalities and argued that internalization may be undesir-
able even if feasible. See Frischmann, 3 Rev L & Econ (cited in note 11); Frischmann and
Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev (cited in note 11).
65 Some might question my inclusion of enablement here, but to enable speakers to
internalize speech externalities generally requires restrictions on other speakers.
66 Of course, this does not ensure that speech-related externalities will not be inter-
nalized. First, the First Amendment constraint is not absolute; second, it does not ensure
that externalities will not be internalized through nongovernmental means. In this Part,
I briefly explore the first reason and leave aside the second.
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with respect to speech.6 7 The First Amendment is not absolute,
however. 68 The constraint acts as a general rule and is subject to
various exceptions and limitations. As a result, the government
can and does regulate some categories of speech. 69 In this Part, I
explore the general contours of First Amendment doctrine to
show how this broad restriction appears to promote spillovers. I
leave a more detailed inquiry for future work.
Putting aside content-neutral regulations (government regu-
lations that restrict communications but that are not based on
content-for example, time, place, and manner restrictions) and
focusing on content-based regulation (government regulations
that restrict communications based on the message or type of
speech conveyed), 70 let me roughly explain the rule and its excep-
tions. 71 Again, my goal is to show how these contours appear to
be spillover-promoting. 72
The default rule is protection from government interference,
though not absolute protection. Courts are considerably wary, if
not outright hostile, to government regulation of speech based on
its content, especially when the speech is perceived to be within
the "core" of protected speech (meaning that the speech does not
67 The First Amendment does not preclude government promotion of speech activities
and spillovers through other means, such as subsidies, infrastructure provision (and
regulation), and government speech. In future work, I would like to expand the ideas in
this Article that largely focus directly on speech to these spillover-promoting institutions
and the foundational role of "core common infrastructure." See Yochai Benkler, Property,
Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core Common Infrastructure 26, White
Paper for the First Amendment Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law
School, available at <http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf> (last visited Apr 26, 2007)
(arguing that "[b]uilding a core common infrastructure serves the central values that
animate the First Amendment"); Frischmann, 74 U Chi L Rev at 1132-34 (cited in note
1).
68 Though the words of the Amendment may seem "quite rigid, absolute, demanding,
clear, ... they are anything but that." Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free
Speech at xii (cited in note 6).
69 This is a considerable understatement. The government regulates plenty of speech,
some that lies within the boundaries of the First Amendment but satisfies the relevant
test set forth by the Supreme Court, but also a "vast expanse of human communication
that lies beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment." Frederick Schauer, The Boun-
daries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
Harv L Rev 1765, 1784 (2004).
70 We will also leave aside viewpoint-based regulation, which is a more worrisome
form of content-based regulation. See Rosenberger v University of Virginia, 515 US 819,
829 (1995) ("When the government targets not [just] subject matter, but particular views
taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more
blatant.").
71 The various categories overlap, have subcategories, are evolving, and have been
subject to sustained criticism. I cannot do justice to the complexities here.
72 Posner and Farber have made similar suggestions. See notes 75-77, 84.
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fall within an exceptional category). As the court noted in R.A. V.
v City of St Paul, "[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively
invalid."73 Courts apply strict scrutiny, striking down the regula-
tion unless it is necessary to further a compelling state interest
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 74
Political speech is within the core of protected First Amend-
ment speech. As discussed above, political speech involves the
communication of ideas used productively in political systems.
The public good nature of ideas enables repeated sharing and
productive use, and such use often has dynamic and systemic
implications in political systems that may be unanticipated or
underappreciated by speakers. As Posner suggests, political
speech generates multiple types of spillovers that make the cate-
gory especially susceptible to underproduction. 75 Government
regulation, which Posner helpfully analogizes to a tax, would on-
ly worsen the problem. 76 Equally important to the problem of
underproduction is the serious concern about error costs from
misdirected regulation. As Posner, Farber, and many others have
noted, First Amendment protection is especially needed for po-
litical speech because of the risk that political speakers (candi-
dates, political parties, etc.) may introduce considerable bias into
73 505 US 377, 382 (1992).
74 The Supreme Court applies a variety of tests involving different levels of scrutiny
for different categories of speech. A full analysis of the Court's analytical framework is
beyond the scope of this Article. It appears that a stricter level of scrutiny generally coin-
cides with speech more likely to yield substantial spillovers, and the tests themselves
may be attuned somewhat to third party effects from speech regulation. On the various
tests, see, for example, Ashutosh Avinash Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Inter-
mediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 3 U Ill L Rev 783 (2007) (providing
a comprehensive assessment of the intermediate scrutiny test); Geoffrey R. Stone, Con-
tent-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46 (1987) (discussing three distinct standards
that the Supreme Court uses to test the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions).
See also Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 Iowa L Rev 1293 (2007) (consid-
ering cost-benefit balancing in speech tests and doctrinal use of "probability thresholds").
75 Posner, 20 Suffolk U L Rev at 22-23 (cited in note 8). See also Farber, 105 Harv L
Rev at 563 (cited in note 8) (referring to political speech as a '"double' public good" be-
cause "[i]nformation contained in political speech is one public good, and political partici-
pation, which is often guided by such information, is a second public good"); Daniel A.
Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory,
33 Fla St U L Rev 913, 935 (2006) ("The externality problem is particularly significant in
the First Amendment area, since speech is protected in part because of its potential bene-
fit to the public. The speech most likely to create these positive externalities is that on
subjects of public concern. This may explain why the government has limited opt-outs by
employees for speech of public concern but not for other types of speech, which do not
create such externalities."). Posner refers to externalities rather than spillovers, but his
conclusion that the externalities associated with political speech were underproduced,
rather than overproduced, suggests that he had positive externalities in mind.
76 Posner, 20 Suffolk U L Rev at 20 (cited in note 8).
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the system. 77 The First Amendment constraint on government
intervention sustains the flow of spillovers from the repeated
sharing and productive use of political speech. 78
One broad exceptional category is commercial speech, which
receives some First Amendment protection. 79 Commercial speech
is not, as the label might suggest, synonymous with economic
speech, which would be a much broader category of speech-
speech that generates value when used in economic systems. In-
stead, commercial speech seems to encompass speech that pro-
poses, executes, or conveys information pertinent to a transac-
tion or an exchange-commercial advertising, for example. In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc, the Supreme Court held that advertising deserves
some limited First Amendment protection.80 Truthful advertising
obtains protection because of its informational value, but false or
misleading advertising may be regulated without triggering the
First Amendment tripwire. 8' False advertising, for example, is
essentially a forced wealth transfer where the speaker presuma-
bly accounts for the costs being imposed on the listener;8 2 in this
context there is little need to preserve spillovers. Truthful adver-
tising may seem to involve relatively few spillovers from retel-
lings or productive use (though in some cases, ads become cul-
77 Id at 22-23; Farber, 105 Harv L Rev at 563-64 (cited in note 8). The primary con-
cern is the influence of "big money" on the political speech we hear and the influence it
would have on any government regulation. Of course, the First Amendment serves as a
critical check on government censorship and bias with respect to political speech.
78 It does not, however, enable participation to the extent that theories of democratic
deliberation would require. See, for example, Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of
Free Speech (cited in note 6). The reasons are many, but one critical reason is that the
costs of participating and reaching an audience have historically been high (at least
where commercial media has been flooded by the well-funded speakers). The Internet
dramatically lowers these costs, enables participation and even "peer production" of po-
litical speech, but also introduces a variety of other complex issues. See Benkler, The
Wealth of Networks (cited in note 1).
79 See Lorillard Tobacco v Reilly, 533 US 525, 553 (2001) (noting that "[flor over 25
years, the Court has recognized that commercial speech does not fall outside the purview
of First Amendment"); 44 Liquormart v Rhode Island, 517 US 484 (1996) (reviewing the
historical progression of the Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis of commercial
speech regulation); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission,
447 US 557, 561 (1980) (holding that "the First Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted
government regulation").
80 425 US 748, 771-72 (1976).
81 Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447 US at 563.
82 The legal standard is strict liability and thus does not require actual or construc-
tive knowledge. See Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a) (2000); Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 USC § 52 (2000). On state laws, see, for example, 1 Callmann on Unfair Competi-
tion, Trademarks & Monopolies § 1:26, at 1-181 (Thomson/West 4th ed 2003).
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tural icons). Yet advertising not only conveys information regard-
ing products or services but also is designed to shape consumer
beliefs and preferences, and thus is intended to be productive
rather than merely consumptive.8 3
Commercial speech may be understood, generally speaking,
as a category of speech where the costs and benefits are largely
accounted for: the speech is generally transactional, the parties
to the transaction mostly capture the benefits and costs, and the
speech is not typically shared. Commercial speech may be a cate-
gory of speech that yields few, if any, positive externalities.8 4 Ac-
cordingly, greater toleration of government regulation would not
appear to diminish spillovers, though that would depend upon
the speech, context, and regulation.8 5
Copyright law8 6 is an example of a broad, structural excep-
tion to the First Amendment.8 7 The federal government regu-
lates speech through copyright law by granting private parties
the right to restrict other persons from speaking in particular
ways, essentially by restricting certain uses of copyright pro-
tected expression.88 The Supreme Court has long recognized that
83 Advertising may play (for better or worse) a more subtle, dynamic and systematic
role in the cultural environment. See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial
Integrity, 85 Tex L Rev 83 (2006) (presenting a normative perspective on sponsorship
disclosure amidst the rise in stealth marketing). I leave aside this complication for pur-
poses of this Article.
84 Posner, 20 Suffolk U L Rev at 39-40 (cited in note 8); Farber, 105 Harv L Rev at
565-66 (cited in note 8). Many of the externalities that do arise may be what economists
call pecuniary externalities.
85 I do not mean to make a strong claim here, as I have sidestepped details about
specific categories of commercial speech where regulation itself may reduce spillovers or
cause other problems. For example, regulating truth/falsity in advertising may encourage
advertisers to shift to "puffery" that is neither true nor false, which may reduce the
amount of useful information available and perhaps may have deleterious effects on the
formation of preferences more generally. I thank Rebecca Tushnet for bringing this point
to my attention. For the best article on puffery, see David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery
Article Ever, 91 Iowa L Rev 1395, 1398 (2006) (arguing that "the problem with puffery
doctrine is not doctrinal chaos" but rather an institutional insufficiency of the courts).
86 Trademark law is as well. See, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law As
Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 SC L Rev 737 (2007). As copyright and trademark law
continue to evolve to meet the demands of the networked information environment, we
may see increased tension with the First Amendment.
87 Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003). The Supreme Court in Eldred distinguished
between a right to speak and a right to speak using someone else's speech, but this dis-
tinction seems a bit strained. It depends on a false, or at least unnecessary, dichotomy
(mine/yours) that presumes completely defined "speech ownership." Copyright is re-
markably more complicated than that and has abandoned the conceit veiled in the con-
cept of romantic authorship. It is just not as simple as saying this is my speech or your
speech because significant components are shared and borrowed. See, for example, Jes-
sica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L J 965 (1990).
88 See 17 USC § 106 (2006).
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copyright is compatible with the First Amendment.8 9 Copyright
law generally targets retellings rather than productive (re)uses,
with some important caveats; for example, copyright law regu-
lates productive uses of copyright protected expression that cre-
ate derivative works. Copyright law depends upon various inter-
nal safeguards, such as the idea-expression dichotomy and the
fair use doctrine, to avoid more intense First Amendment scru-
tiny.90 As I have argued elsewhere, the safeguards tend to pre-
serve the "flow" of spillovers from productive uses, 91 especially
where the uses are of the type that map on to traditional First
Amendment values. Though how well these safeguards achieve
their First Amendment function in practice is subject to debate. 92
Finally, we have the category of unprotected (or minimally
protected) "low value" speech. This category includes obscenity, 93
"fighting words,"94 and other speech not protected by the First
89 In Eldred, the Court noted that "copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and
publication of free expression. As Harper & Row observed: '[The Framers intended copy-
right itself to be the engine of free expression."' Eldred, 537 US at 219 (quoting Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 558 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
But the Court also emphasized that copyright has "built-in First Amendment accommo-
dations," such as fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy. Id. Compatibility is by no
means guaranteed.
90 The Court concluded that "when ... Congress has not altered the traditional con-
tours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary." Eldred,
537 US at 221; Golan v Gonzales, 501 F3d 1179 (10th Cir 2007) (finding that § 514 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act altered the traditional contours of copyright protection);
Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 Colum J L & Arts
397 (2007) (analyzing "traditional contours" notion). The "traditional contours" notion
enunciated in Eldred may provide the vehicle for increased First Amendment scrutiny of
copyright and trademark. See Brett Frischmann, The Death or Rebirth of the Copyright?,
18 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent L J (forthcoming 2008) (transcript from panel pres-
entation, Nov 16, 2007) (making this point with respect to copyright); Brett Frischmann,
Symposium, Trademarks v. Free Speech in Cyberspace, 18 Fordham Intell Prop Media &
Ent L J (forthcoming 2008) (transcript from panel presentation, Nov 16, 2007) (making
the same point for trademark). See also Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the
Groundwork for Greater First Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual Property, 21 Wash U J
L & Pol 11 (2006) (arguing that "there is reason to believe that [the Rehnquist Court] set
the stage for greater First Amendment scrutiny of intellectual property protections').
91 Frischmann and Lemley, 107 Colum L Rev (cited in note 11).
92 See, for example, Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 Stan L Rev 1 (2001) (considering this issue); Molly S. Van Houweling, 83 Tex L
Rev at 1565-66 (cited in note 24) (discussing the "failure of fair use").
93 See Miller v California, 413 US 15, 23 (1973) (explaining that it "has been cate-
gorically settled by the Court that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment"); Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 485 (1957) (holding that "obscenity is not with-
in the area of constitutionally protected speech or press').
94 Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571 (1942) (noting that fighting words
are among a "well-defined and narrowly limited classf of speech, the prevention punish-
ment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem').
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Amendment. 95 These are more easily distinguished from political
and commercial speech based on their predictably low social val-
ue and high social cost. For example, obscenity, like commercial
speech, involves the production of a good that yields very little if
any positive externalities (the benefits are captured by the pro-
ducer/consumer transaction) but potentially large negative ex-
ternalities. 96 As a result, the Supreme Court has cabined obscene
speech from First Amendment protection. In Miller v California,
the Court was forced to define the category of obscene speech and
distinguish it from merely offensive speech. 97 In the companion
case to Miller, the Court rejected the argument that consenting
adults had the right to access obscene speech, 98 and in the opin-
ion the Court expressly discussed the different types of negative
externalities that justified government regulation.
Other examples of unprotected, low value speech, such as
fighting words or incitement, concern speech with private value
to the speaker; little, if any, potential social value through retell-
ing or productive use; and significant potential social harm from
unlawful conduct that is predicted and/or intended to occur. As
in the example of false advertising discussed above, these types
of speech are more akin to forced wealth transfers where the
speaker extracts private value and imposes significant costs on
others without triggering concerns about spillovers.
My objective, for purposes of this Article, is only to suggest
how the First Amendment and its complicated jurisprudence can
be understood from a functional economic perspective as spill-
over-promoting. This Article's brief overview of the First Amend-
95 See, for example, Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 Fla L Rev
843, 845 (2005) (listing categories of unprotected speech, including "threats, fighting
words, obscenity, child pornography, and speech that imminently incites illegal activity").
96 See Catherine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, eds, In Harm's Way: The Por-
nography Civil Rights Hearings (Harvard 1997) (detailing, through the oral testimony of
women, the harms that result from pornography). However, it is important to note that,
due to the amorphous obscenity standards established in Miller ("patently offensive" and
appealing to the "prurient interest'), groups that comprise the sexual minority (such as
gays and lesbians) can potentially be discriminated against or disadvantaged in the name
of upholding community standards of decency. See, for example, Nadine Strossen, "Is
Minnesota Progressive?" A Focus on Sexually Oriented Expression, 33 Wm Mitchell L Rev
51, 74 (2006) ("Obscenity laws in the United States regularly have been used to suppress
expression by individuals who are relatively unpopular or disempowered, whether be-
cause of their ideas or because of their membership in particular societal groups.").
97 Miller, 413 US at 23-24 (confining the permissible scope of regulation of obscene
materials to "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
98 Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 57 (1975).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
ment greatly oversimplifies and does not address a tremendous
amount of writing by courts and scholars. It is a first step.
III. CONCLUSION
I have suggested that it makes sense to think about the First
Amendment, from a functional economic perspective, as an insti-
tutional means for sustaining a spillover-rich environment. In
Part I, I suggested that a government aiming to maximize social
welfare, guided by neoclassical economics, and with the capacity
to regulate speech probably would and should exercise that ca-
pacity, in a substantial set of cases. Yet, as described in Part II,
the First Amendment blocks such "economically efficient" inter-
vention.
Consider the example of fair use in copyright law, an exam-
ple where eliminating or at least significantly narrowing the doc-
trine could reasonably be justified from a neoclassical economic
perspective focused on maximizing social welfare. 99 As the Su-
preme Court made clear in Eldred, Congress could not, without
being subject to more exacting First Amendment scrutiny by the
Court, eliminate fair use. 100 What theoretical perspective ex-
plains this? It is not, in my view, based on a concern over the
costs of government action or checking government power;
though closer, it is not based on concerns about the integrity of
the marketplace of ideas or individual autonomy (eliminating
fair use of copyright protected expression doesn't preclude use of
ideas, one might say). 101 Rather, it appears to be primarily con-
cerned with sustaining spillovers, spillover-producing speech, or,
more generally, a spillover-rich cultural environment. To be
clear, my claim is not that spillovers are an end in themselves.
The concepts of spillovers and spillover-rich environments are
meaningful only when understood to refer to social relationships
99 That is, if we assume arguendo that the government aims to maximize social wel-
fare and is guided by neoclassical economics. The case for eliminating or narrowing the
doctrine would focus on transaction costs-so long as transaction costs are manageable
and licensing is feasible, then there is little need for fair use. See Frischmann and Lem-
ley, 107 Colum L Rev at 286-90 (cited in note 11) (explaining how the "traditional law
and economics explanation of fair use focuses on transaction costs" and why "the transac-
tion cost explanation only captures a portion of the fair use space and does not, and
should not, fully define fair use"). As we noted in Spillovers, others have made this point.
See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response
to Professor Lunney, 82 BU L Rev 1031, 1034 (2002).
100 537 US 186, 221 (2003).
101 Of course, we can fashion arguments based on both theories, but the arguments
are not convincing.
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in context. The concern reflected in Eldred, though certainly not
articulated by the Court, may be stated more accurately (but
verbosely) as a concern about sustaining public participation in
speech-dependent activities that produce positive third party
effects. 10 2 The preamble of Section 107, the fair use provision of
the Copyright Act, lists a few illustrative examples of such activi-
ties: criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, and research. 103 These examples may be best understood to
exemplify activities where participants are "situated" in particu-
lar relationships and contexts that have social meaning and ef-
fects beyond the immediate participants (meaning and effects
often underappreciated by those participants). 10 4
One standard reply to the argument I have made in this Ar-
ticle would be to say "of course, that's because the First Amend-
ment is not about economics at all"; we accept efficiency losses
because of other non-economic values. 105 This reply makes some
sense, but seems incomplete. It may be the case that the underly-
ing economic theory itself is incomplete, and that an economic
approach that recognized the value of spillovers and institutional
structures that support participation in their production might
tell us a different story and lead us to focus on different ques-
tions. For example, we might be interested in dynamic considera-
tions and the macroeconomic consequences of promoting spill-
overs. And even if it does not tell a different story or raise new
questions (though I think it does), it is still worthwhile to exam-
ine the nature of the economic-noneconomic tradeoffs from a
102 One might wonder whether the Court's treatment of duration pushes the other
way, that is, away from sustaining spillovers. It is true that durational limits on copy-
rights and patents sustain temporal spillovers, as the public can freely engage in retel-
lings and productive uses when the copyright or patent expires. The temporal spillovers
associated with copyright are probably more closely associated with retellings (recall the
joke example) rather than productive uses because spillovers from productive uses are
sustained by internal doctrines, such as fair use and idea-expression, which operate re-
gardless of duration. Given the lack of such doctrines in patent law, durational limits on
patents, by contrast, play a much more significant role in sustaining spillovers from pro-
ductive uses.
103 17 USC § 107 (2000).
104 See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L Rev 347
(2005) (on situated users and social context); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented
Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev 1525 (2004) (on fair use "patterns" that
constitute and reflect social relationships and context); Frischmann and Lemley, 107
Colum L Rev at 286-90 (cited in note 11) (on participants' failure to fully appreciate third
party effects in such contexts).
105 Another reply would be that the costs of internalizing externalities in the speech
context are simply too high to bother with. That is, an economic reply to the story I have
told would dispute my contention that government regulation would be justified in a
substantial set of cases.
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functional economic perspective, because doing so frames and
helps identify the nature of tradeoffs made in the law-not just
in the First Amendment area but also in copyright, communica-
tions, and other areas that look like broad exceptions to the First
Amendment. 106
In the beginning, I noted first that many of the hottest de-
bates in many areas of information/communications law are oc-
curring because of technological and social changes associated
with the Internet, and second that at the core of many of these
debates, there seem to be First Amendment concerns lurking. In
closing, let me say a few words about these two observations in
the context of copyright and trademark law. 107 In large part, po-
tential conflicts arise in the Internet context because of the many
new opportunities for people to use someone else's copyrights and
trademarks. Of course, there have always been opportunities to
use others' intellectual property without authorization. Before
the rise of the digital networked environment, however, the op-
portunities for individuals to use others' works were pretty lim-
ited-in terms of their immediate commercial impact and their
disruptive potential, but also in terms of their communicative
potential. It was really commercial users and distributors-often
competitors-that made commercially relevant unauthorized use
of others' intellectual property, and it was this set of unauthor-
ized uses that copyright and trademark laws were designed pri-
marily to regulate. The rise of a digital networked environment
has fundamentally altered the landscape and sent tremendous
ripples throughout copyright and trademark law and associated
markets.
From a First Amendment perspective, the striking feature of
the digital networked environment is its enabling features, spe-
cifically its speech-enabling features. It offers a wide range of
opportunities for individuals to participate productively in politi-
106 In a sense, cultural environmentalism faces a similar dilemma as environmental-
ism. The persistent difficulty in noticing, much less appreciating or measuring, the value
of various nonmarket, system-oriented benefits seems to lead to three troublesome ap-
proaches to framing tradeoffs and decision-making: (i) ignoring or seriously undervaluing
the benefits, (ii) attempting to value via market-based proxies, and (iii) avoiding econom-
ics altogether.
107 I do not focus on other areas of information/communications law. But, as an astute
reviewer reminded me, I should note that technological and social changes associated
with the Internet may strengthen the case for government regulation of speech in some
contexts. The speech-enabling features do not themselves discriminate between "good"
and "bad" speech, and it may be the case that the filtering mechanism I described briefly
in Part I does not work as well in the online environment. I leave consideration of this
issue for future work.
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cal, intellectual, and cultural activities through the use of vari-
ous Internet-enabled communications technologies, including
simple email or blog software and complex social networking
platforms, among many others. These general purpose, content
neutral, and easy-to-use technologies facilitate participation on
an unprecedented scale, and on balance have yielded significant
social value (often, in the form of spillovers). Yochai Benkler de-
scribes this very well in his recent book, The Wealth of Net-
works. 108 And yet, as we know, much of the raw material in our
communications derives from cultural sources that we encounter
daily. Our use of such materials has not always implicated copy-
right or trademark law, but that has changed in part because of
the emergence of the Internet and the nature of our communica-
tions online and in part because of the manner in which the laws
have evolved. 109 First Amendment issues lurk and may rise in
frequency and prominence in the emergent communications en-
vironment, and how such issues will be resolved remains to be
seen.
By design, this Article has raised more questions than it has
answered. As noted throughout, I have tabled issues for future
consideration and attempted to avoid normative implications. To
conclude, let me list a few avenues for future research:
i) Further analysis of different types of speech spillovers
and the relationship with various speech-dependent sys-
tems. Once one moves beyond the fact that speech in-
volves the sharing of ideas, which is itself an important
source of spillovers, and begins to explore the variance
among ideas and the relationships between such sharing
and productive use of ideas, the potential to take advan-
tage of nonrivalry and to produce spillovers in speech-
dependent social systems adds a layer of complexity that
is underexplored. What are the functional and normative
relationships between speech and cultural, economic, po-
litical, and other social systems? To what extent does
speech build capacity and enable participation in these
different systems?
108 Benkler, The Wealth of Networks (cited in note 1).
109 See, for example, Chris Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan L Rev 485
(2004) (discussing the elimination of formalities and the pervasive reach of copyright
law).
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ii) Further analysis of the (tentative) argument that we
might expect a tendency toward positive (rather than nega-
tive) externalities. I suggested that this might occur be-
cause of filtering by retellers and reusers, but that sug-
gestion may depend upon certain assumptions (for exam-
ple, rational contemplation) and may require deeper con-
sideration of decisionmaking in particular speech contexts
(storytelling versus joke telling, commercial versus politi-
cal settings, and so on).'A related and important consid-
eration is where this tendency reverses.
iii)Mapping First Amendment doctrine more completely to
determine where an awareness or concern over spillover
potential is or ought to be relevant, and to what degree.
The second Part of this Article barely scratched the sur-
face of the First Amendment jurisprudence. It would be
interesting, for example, to consider levels of scrutiny and
the various tests applied by courts to determine when the
tests are spillover conscious. Another example that might
be worth considering is whether categories of economic or
cultural speech may be identified based on spillover po-
tential; economic or social commentary that is not politi-
cally relevant may yield substantial spillovers and yet not
fit neatly within the existing conception of "core" pro-
tected speech.
iv)Exploring the implications of the theory for First
Amendment treatment of Mass Media-Network Interme-
diaries-Infrastructure Providers. This line of inquiry
may be quite expansive as it would necessarily consider
classic mass media regulation but would also address
emergent areas involving government regulation of net-
work intermediaries. The resources, institutions, and
markets that structure the speech environment effectively
determine the range of opportunities or capabilities for
speech and, consequently, participation in speech-
dependent systems. Sustaining a spillover-rich environ-
ment may call for neutrality principles that apply to pri-
vate actors that build, control, or regulate the speech en-
vironment. 110
110 See notes 2, 44.
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v) Exploring the relationships between the spillover ap-
proach and existing normative theories. The functional
economic view described in this article overlaps in inter-
esting ways with other First Amendment theories and
concerns. The search for truth (marketplace of ideas), self-
governance, self-fulfillment/autonomy, social stability,
and other theories potentially can be understood to sup-
port a First Amendment designed to sustain a spillover-
rich environment where a wide variety of different speech
activities promote many different types of spillovers; the
theories often focus on certain types at the exclusion of
others. 111
... On these theories, see, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone et al, Constitutional Law
1054-59 (Aspen 5th ed 2005). Scholars have critiqued one or another of these theories for
failing to explain particular doctrines or outcomes or for over- or under-emphasizing some
normative value; in the end, most seem to agree that multiple theories together provide
an "adequate conception of freedom of speech." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 789 (Foundation 2d ed 1988).
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